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I. Intellectual Property Introduction.  Intellectual property (“IP”) generally describes the 
intangible property created by human intellect, and may include inventions, literary works, 
artistic works, logos, and designs, any of which may be used commercially by the owner.  
Federal law and many state laws grant certain exclusive rights in intellectual property and 
enforcement rights against those who use the IP without consent of the owner.  The four major 
areas of IP discussed in this paper are copyrights, trademarks, patents, and trade secrets.   
A. Copyrights.  Protection of original works of authorship is provided under the Copyright 
Act, which protects any such works that are “fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”1 
Examples of original works include the text of literary works such as articles, essays and books, 
paintings and illustrations, music and lyrics, photographs, choreography, and computer 
programs.2  This federal copyright protection is provided immediately once the original work is 
“fixed” and does not require a federal registration with the Copyright Office.3  Copyright 
protection confers the owner with the exclusive right to use, copy and distribute the original 
work in any medium and the right to make derivative works thereof along with the right to 
license any of these rights to a third party.  The duration of protection and exclusive rights 
granted under the Copyright Act is limited to a finite period of time, and for an organization 
responsible for creating original works, the duration of the copyright protection is the earlier of 
120 years from creation or 95 years from publication.4   
B. Trademarks.  Trademarks and service marks are words, designs, colors, symbols, sounds, 
or a combination of these used in association with goods or services and that identify a company 
or entity.5  In the United States, common law rights in a trademark are usually obtained by the 
first party to use a mark for specific goods or services in a specific geographic area.  This use 
provides the owner with the exclusive right to use the mark in that geographic region and can be 
perpetual there as long as the mark is in use and not abandoned.  Trademark rights may be 
protected under both state and federal registrations; however, a registration with the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office generally provides the owner with exclusive rights to use the mark 
nationwide; whereas, state registrations are limited to exclusive rights and protection within a 
1 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
2 Id.  
3 Id. § 304 (for works created on or after January 1, 1978). 
4 Id. § 302(a),(c). 
5 Id. § 1127. 
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state.   In fact, the state registrations may also be preempted by a federal registration, and thus, 
may provide no more than common law rights established where the mark has been in use.6  
If the mark is federally registered, in addition to use requirement to avoid abandonment 
of the mark, the owner must also make the requisite maintenance filings with the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office to preserve the registration.  For example, after the fifth and no later than the 
sixth year of registration, the trademark owner must file a declaration of continued use along 
with a sample specimen of use.7  In addition, a renewal application and specimen of use must be 
filed every ten years, beginning with the tenth year from the registration date.8 
In addition to continued use of the mark, the owner has a duty to police the use of its 
mark by unauthorized parties to avoid a claim that the owner has abandoned rights in its mark.  
Even for authorized users who have been granted a license to use the owner’s mark, the 
trademark owner must exercise some degree of control over the licensee so that the 
goods/services provided by the licensee under the mark meet the standards required by the 
trademark owner.  By exercising the quality control standards for the licensee’s goods and 
services, the trademark owner helps maintain the value and goodwill associated with its mark. 
 
C. Patents.  A patent is a right that is granted by the federal government for an invention that 
provides the inventor or owner of the patent with the right to exclude others from making, using, 
or selling the invention for a specific period of time in exchange for the public disclosure of the 
invention when the patent is granted as well as the right to license such rights during the period 
of patent protection.9  Typically, inventions that are subject to patent protection are useful 
machines, processes, compositions (collectively “Utility Patents”), or ornamental designs 
(“Design Patents”) or even new varieties of plants.10  For patent applications filed since 1995, 
the term of a Utility Patent is twenty years from the application filing date. For design patents 
filed on or after December 18, 2013, the term is fifteen years from the date of issuance; for those 
filed before December 18, 2013, the term is fourteen years from issuance.11 
D. Trade secrets.  A trade secret is type of intellectual property that is comprised typically of 
any information, data, device, process, formula, or technique that is of economic value to a 
company or entity, that is not readily ascertainable by the public, and that the owner has 
undergone reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy (including limiting the number of employees 
provided access to such).12  The protection afforded trade secrets is governed by state law, but 
most states, including Texas, have adopted to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act to harmonize the 
standards governing the protection and remedies for misappropriation.13  Examples of things that 
6 See e.g., Minute Man of Am., Inc. v. Coastal Rests., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 197, 198 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (noting that the 
Texas registration was limited to the area of use as against a federal registrant regardless when the federal 
registration occurs); HERBERT J. HAMMOND, TEXAS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW HANDBOOK 149-50 (2d ed. 
2011).  
7 15 U.S.C. § 1058. 
8 Id. §§ 1058, 1059. 
9 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 271(a).  
10 Id.  §§  §§ 101, 161, 171.   
11 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(2), 173. 
12 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 134A.002(6); see also Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1. 
13 See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 134A.002(6); see also Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1.   
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might be considered a trade secret for a non-profit organization include donor lists, financial 
data, and fundraising strategies.   
II. How is intellectual property important to nonprofits?  For all non-profit organizations, 
intellectual property is important whether it is intellectual property created by the organization or 
instead is intellectual property used by the organization in the operation of its business.  The 
following are examples of areas in which intellectual property rights can be critical to a nonprofit 
entity: 
• Branding and marketing 
• Educational materials 
• Brochures 
• Discoveries/inventions made by the non-profit 
• Fundraising and development activities 
• Website content 
• Social Media 
• Software  
• Vendors  
III. Intellectual Property owned by the Nonprofit. 
A. Marks and Branding.  One of the most important forms of intellectual property of a non-
profit organization may be its trade name.  Along with the name, the organization may utilize a 
unique design and/or tag lines, all of which consumers would associate with the organization.  
Such name and/or logo would be considered a mark because it serves as a source identifier of the 
organization.   
If the nonprofit organization provides services that reach beyond one state or to the extent 
that such would be considered use in interstate commerce, the organization should consider 
obtaining federal trademark protection for its brand and tag lines.  The benefits of a federal 
trademark registration include the following:  the presumption of nationwide exclusive rights to 
the use mark; the right to use the symbol ; the right to sue for infringement in federal court;  a 
presumption of validity of the mark; potentially enhanced remedies; constructive notice of a 
claim of ownership, and the right to keep other confusingly similar marks off of the federal 
trademark registry and even some state registries.14  Even if the mark is not federally registered, 
14 15 U.S.C. §§   1111, 1115(a); Xtreme Lashes, LLC v. Xtended Beauty, Inc. 576 F.3d 221, 232 (5th Cir. 2009); 
Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 533 n.4 (5th Cir. 1998).  
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federal law may still protect an unregistered mark from the use of a confusingly similar mark in 
the geographic use of the organization’s mark.15 
 
B. Original Works of Authorship.  Essential to a nonprofit organization is its original works 
of authorship, whether they are development materials, educational materials, videos, website 
content, or other original works.  As noted above, any original work of authorship fixed in a 
tangible medium is afforded copyright protection under the copyright Act.16  Typically, an 
organization or company will own any such original work of authorship as a “work made for 
hire” if an employee of the organization has developed or created the work as a part of the scope 
of his or her employment.17  The “work made for hire” doctrine applies to any work created by 
the employee in the scope of his or her employment.18  Many companies and organizations 
include the concept of “work made for hire” in their employment policies to educate their 
employees on this issue even though it is not necessary for title  to the copyright to vest in the 
name of the organization or company.    
The more complicated issue arises when an employee creates a work that could be 
outside the scope of his or her employment.  A few examples could include the following: 
• A photograph taken by employee at a company picnic and published on the company 
website (when photography is not a component of the employee’s job 
responsibilities); 
• A company logo designed by an employee in a company contest allowing employees 
to submit a proposed logo to be voted on by all employees;  
• Website content created by an employee whose normal job duties are related to 
finance and accounting; and 
• An article written for a company newsletter by an employee as a contributor and not a 
part of the newsletter staff at the company. 
If any of the above are activities outside of the employee’s typical duties, it is possible 
that these works may not be owned by the organization as works made for hire, and instead may 
be works whose copyrights are owned by the employee (i.e., the original creator).19  In such 
cases,  to avoid any uncertainty regarding the copyright ownership of these works, the 
organization could have the employee assign to the organization any and all rights that he or she 
“has” or “may have” in the work.  One way for obtaining such assignment would be to include a 
present assignment provision in the employment agreement, which would cause the assignment 
to be effective upon the creation of any work.   Alternatively, the employment agreement could 
15 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A); Marathon Mfg. Co. v. Enerlite Prods. Corp., 767 F.2d 214, 217 (5th Cir. 1985). 
16 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
17 Id. § 101. 
18 Id. § 101; see also Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989) (noting that the 
following would be considered in determining whether the creator of the work is an employee:  tax treatment; 
provision of benefits; work location; resources provided by employer; payment method; the hiring party’s right to 
control the manner and means by which the work is accomplished; and the duration of the relationship between the 
parties). 
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require that the employee assign his or her rights in the work upon the employee’s submission of 
any work to the organization.   
Due to the potential volume of original works of authorship that could be owned by an 
non-profit organization or any company, it is likely unrealistic to assume that an entity would 
register all of its original works with the Copyright Office; however, all organizations should 
consider registering works that are vital or that add substantial value to the organization.   The 
following may be examples of such works:   
• Videos 
• Development and fundraising strategies  
• Books  
• Promotional materials 
• Educational materials, booklets 
• Testing materials 
• Workshop/seminar materials 
• Music (original to the organization) 
• Computer programs 
• Collections of images 
19 See U.S. Auto Parts Network, Inc. v. Parts Geek, LLC 692 F.3d 1009, 1015 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that “courts 
have accordingly adopted [the Restatement (2d) of Agency] section 228’s three-prong test for determining when a 
work is made by an employee ‘within the scope’ of employment: ‘(a) it is of the kind  [the employee] is employed to 
perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; [and] (c) it is actuated, at least in 
part, by a purpose to serve the [employer]”). 
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Registration is not required for copyright protection; however, a copyright registration 
prior to the infringement of a work will provide the copyright owner with a broader remedy—
specifically, the copyright owner would have a right to choose statutory damages imposed by the 
court instead of relying on actual damages, which might be difficult for the court to calculate.20 
As a deterrent to unauthorized copying as well as basis for claiming willful infringement, 
an entity should include a copyright notice on all materials.  Such notice typically identifies the 
year of first publication and copyright owner, as shown below:   
© 2015 ABC Foundation 
No registration is required for the inclusion of the © notice symbol.  In the copyright 
notice, an organization may also identify what rights, if any, a third party may have to use or 
reproduce the work.  Such language could be added to the notice provision, as follows: 
• © 2015 ABC Foundation.  All rights reserved.  No copies, reprints, or 
reproductions may be made without the express authorization of ABC 
Foundation.   
or 
• © 2015 ABC Foundation.  All rights reserved.  Reproductions and copies may be 
made for personal use only. 
or 
• © 2015 ABC Foundation.  All rights reserved.  Copies, reprints, or reproductions 
may be made by [insert limitations/restrictions].   
C. Inventions and Discoveries.  In the event that a non-profit entity is directly involved in 
scientific research, technological developments, and the like, patent protection may be available 
for such intellectual property.21  As noted above, patent protection provides the patent owner 
with exclusive rights to prevent third parties from making, using or selling the patented invention 
but only for a limited period of time.   In order for an inventor or owner of an invention to obtain 
an issued utility patent, the inventor is required to file the patent application within one year of 
the first public use of the invention.22  Unlike the ownership of original works created by 
employees within the scope of their employment, which are considered works made for hire 
under the Copyright Act, inventions created by employees within the scope of employment are 
not solely owned by the employer.  In fact, prior to the amendment of U.S. patent law by the 
America Invents Act of 2013, employee inventors were the owners of the inventions identified in 
patent applications.  For such an organization to own the patent for an invention created by the 
organization’s employee, regardless of whether the invention was made within the scope of the 
employee’s job, the employee had to assign the ownership of the patent to his or her employer 
despite the fact that the invention was developed within the scope of employment.  The America 
Invents Act has made it easier for employers/companies to own the patents for inventions 
developed by their employees by having the inventor-employee submit a declaration stating 
20 17 U.S.C. § 412(1); see also 17 U.S.C. § 504. 
21 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271. 
22 Id. § 102(b). 
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whether the inventor is under an obligation to assign the invention.23  To the extent that the 
organization expects to own all rights in a patent, it should have the employee assign its rights to 
the organization, which assignment shall be filed with the U.S. patent and Trademark office. 
IV. Special Issues. 
A. Works created by independent contractors, consultants, and developers.  A common 
misperception is that any work product created by a third-party on behalf of a company is owned 
by the company.  Such third-party work product consists of website pages, custom software 
applications, photographs, training materials, architectural drawings, and the like.  What is likely 
owned by the company is a copy of the work product provided to the organization but not the 
copyright for that work product.  For example, an organization may hire a photographer to take 
photographs of images to be used on the organization’s website as well as in marketing 
materials.  The organization may be given the right to make unlimited copies of the photographs 
or it may have an implied right to use the photographs in any medium; however, the actual 
copyright ownership still remains with the photographer.  In another example, the organization 
may have hired a software developer to create a custom program to be used in operation of the 
organization’s business. The organization would not be able to make enhancements or other 
modifications to the program (i.e., derivative works) without assignment of all rights or without, 
a license granting the organization such specific rights.   
The organization may not really care whether it has a perpetual license or full ownership 
in the copyright of any work product created on its behalf as long as it has a perpetual right to 
use and modify the work product. If it has invested huge sums in the development of the work 
product, the organization is more likely to seek full title to the copyright.  If ownership in all 
intellectual property rights of such work product is desired, then the organization may want to 
consider including assignment clause in the services contract, transferring ownership either upon 
creation of the work product or upon payment in full for the services to develop the work 
product.   
B. Affiliated organizations or local chapters.  For an organization who has local chapters or 
affiliated organizations authorized to use the organization’s intellectual property, such 
organization should consider having its local groups and affiliates enter into a license agreement 
to spell out the specific terms of use.  With respect to the trademarks and logos, it is particularly 
important to include standards of use to avoid a claim of abandonment and also to help avoid 
damage to the organization’s reputation by the affiliated party’s use.  In the event that the 
organization has many chapters or other potential sublicensees, having trademark use guidelines 
available online and easily accessible is a convenient way to provide use standards.  Such 
guidelines could also specify how copyright-protected materials may be used.   
C. Volunteers.  Many nonprofit organizations engage the assistance of volunteers, especially 
in fundraising events and educational programs.  It is not uncommon for a volunteer to create 
materials on behalf of the organization; however, it is likely that the intellectual property rights 
of such materials would be owned by the volunteer—not the organization.  Arguably, without 
any agreement to the contrary, the organization likely has an implied license to use the materials 
23 Id. §§  115, 118. 
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created on behalf of the organization for at least as long as the volunteer is involved with the 
organization, but such license could easily be revoked.  To avoid the uncertainty associated with 
the organization’s ability to use or continue use of the volunteer’s materials, the organization 
should consider having all volunteers either assign his or her rights to the organization or grant a 
perpetual, irrevocable license to the organization.  This could easily be accomplished by having 
the volunteer sign a simple release, which would include a disclaimer of any ownership rights in 
any materials created by the volunteer on behalf of the organization as well as a present 
assignment clause assigning to the organization ownership to the IP rights in the materials upon 
their creation.    Alternatively, the volunteer could execute a simple license agreement granting a 
perpetual, royalty-free, irrevocable license to the organization.   
• Example of a present assignment provision:  “Volunteer acknowledges and agrees 
that all right, title and interest in and to original works of authorship created by 
Volunteer on behalf of Organization, including without limitation all copyrights 
thereof, shall be owned by Organization and upon creation of any such materials, 
Volunteer hereby assigns all right, title and interest that he/she has or may have in 
such materials to Organization.” 
• Example of a perpetual license provision:  “Organization acknowledges that 
Volunteer owns all right, title and interest in and to original works created by 
Volunteer on behalf of Organization, including without limitation all copyrights 
thereof; however, Volunteer hereby grants to Organization a perpetual, irrevocable, 
royalty-free, nonexclusive, worldwide, license to use such materials and to make 
copies and derivative works thereof.” 
D. Domain names.  It is common for entities, including nonprofit organizations, to own 
numerous domain names that ultimately resolve to the same website address for the entity.  For 
example, ABC Foundation may acquire the following domain names <abcfoundation.org>, 
<abcfoundation.com>, <abcfoundation.net>, and <abcfoundationdallas.org> and have them all 
resolve to the same website.  There is little policing performed by domain name registrars to 
prevent unauthorized parties from acquiring domain names that incorporate another party’s 
trademark even though in their terms of use, most registrars require that the party obtaining a 
domain name represent and warrant that its registration will not directly or indirectly infringe the 
legal rights of a third party.  This unauthorized use of an organization’s mark may be an 
unintentional infringement and may occur, for example, when an affiliated entity of the non-
profit organization or a local chapter registers a domain name that incorporates the entity’s mark 
or trade name without that party having authorization to do so.  Any rights granted to the affiliate 
or chapter related to the use of the parent organization’s mark or trade name within a domain 
name should be addressed in the trademark use guidelines and/or license agreement with such 
third party. 
A potentially more serious problem is the use of the organization’s mark or trade name in 
a domain name by an unauthorized and unrelated party.  Such use may constitute infringement if 
the domain name leads to an active website that either serves as a pay-per-click website with 
links to other commercial websites or serves as the website for a specific commercial 
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enterprise.24  The Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”) may provide a claim 
under which the organization can stop this unauthorized use of its mark in a domain name;25 
however, instead of filing a lawsuit under the ACPA, another option for the organization would 
be to initiate a domain name dispute resolution proceeding.26  Typically, these proceedings are 
trademark-owner friendly, provided that the trademark owner is able to show that the use and 
registration of the its mark the infringer is in bad faith.  A dispute resolution proceeding 
generally involves the filing of a complaint with an arbitration body authorized for such 
proceedings, such as the National Arbitration Forum, and the submission of a response by the 
allegedly-infringing domain-name owner.  Depending upon the arbitration entity, a supplemental 
submission may be allowed, but no discovery or other filings are required.  A decision usually 
follows within two to three months of the infringer’s response.   
One “allowable” use of an organization’s mark that can be particularly frustrating may 
occur when a third party incorporates into its domain name the organization’s mark along 
additional words and together the mark and words are construed as free speech under the First 
Amendment.  The following provides an example of the differences between an infringing use 
and a first amendment use: 
Example:  In this example, ABC Foundation and XYZ are unrelated entities, and ABC 
Foundation is a well-known entity.  XYZ’s registration and use of the domain name 
<abcfoundation.org> that resolves to a website of XYZ Company may be infringement if 
there is no legitimate basis for XYZ Company’s registration or use of the domain name 
incorporating the ABC Foundation name; however, a third party’s registration and use of 
the domain name <abcfoundationsucks.com> that resolves to a website devoted to 
editorials about ABC Foundation may be protected as free speech.27   
 
E. Website Issues.  In addition to content, which would be considered intellectual property 
protected under the Copyright Act, there are other issues that organizations should address with 
respect to their websites.   
1. Privacy Policy.  Many nonprofit organizations collect information online, whether it be 
information from its members, donors, or other website users interacting with the website and 
regardless of whether such information is personally-identifiable information or nonpersonally 
identifiable, such as a cookie.  Any business or entity that collects information through an online 
website should have a privacy policy, with a conspicuous link at least on the page in which 
24  See, e.g., E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 286 F.3d 270, 272-77 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that the Anti-
Cybersquatting statute directs a reviewing court to consider whether a defendant’s bad faith intent to profit from the 
use of a mark held by another party in its domain name). 
25 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). 
26 See, e.g., Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND 
NUMBERS (Oct. 24, 1999), available at https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/udrp-2012-02-25-en.  
27 See, e.g., Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 778 (6th Cir. 2003) (“We find that Mishkoff's use of 
Taubman's mark in the domain name "taubmansucks.com" is purely an exhibition of Free Speech, and the Lanham 
Act is not invoked. And although economic damage might be an intended effect of Mishkoff's expression, the First 
Amendment protects critical commentary when there is no confusion as to source, even when it involves the 
criticism of a business. Such use is not subject to scrutiny under the Lanham Act.”) Note, however, that this decision 
does not take in to account a situation where factually untrue statements are made by the “sucks” site, which could 
be actionable.  
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information is collected. 28  Typically, state law governs the specific requirements for website 
privacy policies so these may vary from state to state; however, most require that the following 
be included:  
• What information is collected; 
• How the information is used; 
• Whether the information is shared with third parties and if so, what is shared; 
• An Internet user opt-out policy; and 
• How the information is deleted.   
Failing to implement a privacy policy could subject to the organization to penalties by the state 
attorneys general; however, an organization’s failure to follow its own written policy may 
subject the organization to steep fines issued by the Federal Trade Commission as a breach of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act.29   
2. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”).  For any organizations whose 
websites are directed at or may be directed at children and that collect information from children, 
the organization should comply with the regulations of COPPA.30  Generally, COPPA requires 
prior parental consent for the collection of identifiable information by a website directed at 
children if the children are under age thirteen.31  There are various methods of obtaining such 
consent, but there are also some actions that  can be taken that help the website owner avoid 
liability.32  One common way for a website to avoid having to meet the  COPPA regulations is to 
have an online pre-registration procedure that prevents children under age thirteen from 
proceeding with registration.33  Such pre-registration procedure might include requiring the 
Internet user to enter his or her birthdate, both the birthdate and current school grade, or some 
other age-identifying questions provided that the questions do not suggest the age threshold for 
being able to register with the site.  Organizations who have websites that are or that might be 
directed at children but also who want to avoid issues with having to obtain parental consent will 
typically have pre-registration procedures to block children under age thirteen from registering.   
3. Terms of Use. 
a. Click-wrap vs. Browse-wrap.  All websites, especially those that allow users to 
upload or submit content, should have terms of use.  Websites should have a conspicuous link to 
the terms of use on the home page and also on the registration page, if applicable.  For the 
websites that do not require the user to agree to the terms of use by clicking “I Agree” or “Yes” 
28 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575-22578; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-471; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-37-
101, -102, -201, -202, -203; 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.00. 
29 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58. 
30 Id. §§ 6501-6506.   
31 Id. §§  6501, 6502(a)(1). 
32 Id. § 6502(a)(2). 
33 Id. §  6503; 16 C.F.R § 312.11. 
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or some other form of active assent, such “browse wrap” agreements, the terms of use are 
typically not enforceable because the user has not had to affirmatively assent—i.e., has not had 
to click “I agree”—to the terms.34  In contrast, however, “click wrap” agreements are typically 
enforceable because the user has affirmatively agreed to the terms of use after having had the 
opportunity to review them.   
b. Digital Millennium Copyright Act Take-Down Provision.  For any website that 
allows a third party to upload or submit content, the website owner/service provider should 
comply with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) take-down provisions in order to 
avoid liability for copyright-infringement claims based on the content uploaded by a third party 
to the organization’s website.35  The DMCA take-down provision provides a safe harbor 
provided that the service provider: 
• does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on 
the system or network is infringing;   
• in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from 
which infringing activity is apparent;  
• upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or 
disable access to, the material;   
• does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a 
case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity;  
• upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), responds 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be 
infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity; and   
• has designated an agent to receive notifications of claimed infringement by making 
available through its service, including on its website in a location accessible to the 
public, and by providing to the Copyright Office  
The Register of Copyrights maintains a current directory of agents available to the public for 
inspection. 36 
In the event that an organization receives a DMCA notice of alleged copyright 
infringement on its website, the organization should immediately remove the allegedly infringing 
work, but the organization must also notify the  party who posted or uploaded the content to that 
website and must allow that party to respond.37  The failure of an organization to respond to a 
DMCA notice  by refusing to take down the allegedly infringing content could make the 
organization liable for at contributory or induced infringement and liable potentially for direct 
infringement.38  The DMCA further limits the liability of nonprofit educational institutions when 
34 See, e.g generally, Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming the district court’s 
denial of Barnes & Noble’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that Barnes & Noble’s browse-wrap terms were 
unenforceable).  
35 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
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an employee (faculty member or graduate student) uses the institutions’ resources to obtain 
copyrighted material in performing a teaching or research function.39 The institutions’ liability is 
limited so long as: 
• The employee’s infringing activities do not involve providing online access to course 
materials that were required or recommended during the past three years;  
• The institution has not received more than two notifications regarding the copyright 
infringement of that employee within the past three-year period; and   
• The institution distributes information to all users regarding its compliance with all 
copyright laws.40  
Even though take down notices may not be required for other forms of intellectual property 
infringement claims, many website owners have incorporated similar take down provisions for 
claims of trademark infringement and the infringement of other proprietary rights.  
c. Representations and Warranties.  Terms of use should also identify (i) prohibited 
uses of the website, (ii) representations and warranties of users, and (iii) indemnification 
provisions for a user’s breach.  Included in the representations and warranties should be those 
provisions in which the user represents and warrants that the copyright in any content submitted 
or uploaded by the user is owned by the user, or alternatively, that the user obtained a license or 
authorization to post or upload the content on the website.  In addition, the user should represent 
and warrant that such content will not infringe the intellectual property of any third parties.  A 
breach of either of these provisions could provide the organization with breach of contract rights, 
including the right to recover attorneys’ fees.  As additional protection, however, the website 
owner would likely want to include an indemnification clause to cover third-party claims that the 
uploaded content has infringed the intellectual property rights of a third party.  In the event that 
the Internet user has no substantial assets, however, the organization may be at risk because the 
user may be considered “judgment proof” and may not be able to pay damages for a breach of 
warranty or to indemnify the organization.   
F. Vendor agreements.  Some nonprofit organizations may provide vendors or suppliers 
with the right to use the organization’s name and/or logos on certain types of promotional 
materials, such as t-shirts, buttons, accessories, and materials used by chapters, affiliates, or other 
entities.   Vendors should have a trademark license incorporated into the vendor agreements, and 
this license should be limited in time and to use on certain products.  As noted above in Section 
I.B., it is important that the license have quality control provisions requiring the vendor to meet 
certain standards for the products manufactured and sold under the organization’s marks.  This 
license should also include provisions providing the organization with the right to inspect the 
products and pre-approve all uses of the mark.  Failure to incorporate the quality control 
provisions into a vendor agreement could make it difficult for the organization to claim that it 
36 Id. § 512(c).   
37 Id. §  512 (c),(g). 
38 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 935-37 (2005) (Grokster P2P service 
found liable for inducing copyright infringement for operating file sharing service.).  
39 17 U.S.C. § 512(e). 
40 Id. 
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exercised the requisite control over the mark to avoid abandonment.  Finally, the term of use of 
the organization’s mark should be limited and may actually terminate upon the sell of all  
inventory bearing the licensed mark.   
V. Unrelated Business Income Tax (“UBIT”): General Rules.41 To the extent a nonprofit 
sells or licenses its IP to others, the nonprofit needs to consider whether the proceeds from the 
sale or license results in unrelated business income for the nonprofit. 
 
A. Definition of Unrelated Business.  Organizations described in Section 501(c)(3) of the 
Code42 are generally subject to income tax on the net income produced from engaging in an 
unrelated trade or business activity.43  The term “unrelated trade or business” means an activity 
conducted by a tax-exempt organization which is regularly carried on44 for the production of 
income from the sale of goods or performance of services45 and which is not substantially related 
to the performance of the organization’s charitable, educational or other exempt functions.46   
 
1. Activity is a “Trade or Business.”  For purposes of the unrelated business income tax 
regime, “the term ‘trade or business’ has the same meaning it has in Section 162, and generally 
includes any activity carried on for the production of income from the sale of goods or 
performance of services.”47  Section 162 of the Code governs the deductibility of trade or 
business expenses.  In that context, the U.S. Supreme Court has declared that “to be engaged in a 
trade or business, the taxpayer must be involved in the activity with continuity and regularity and 
. . . the taxpayer’s primary purpose for engaging in the activity must be for income or profit.”48  
When applying this test, the IRS may take into account a key purpose of the unrelated business 
income tax: to prevent unfair competition between taxable and tax-exempt entities.  “[W]here an 
activity does not possess the characteristics of a trade or business within the meaning of section 
162, such as when an organization sends out low cost articles incidental to the solicitation of 
charitable contributions, the unrelated business income tax does not apply since the organization 
is not in competition with taxable organizations.”49   
 
 The most important element as to whether the activity is a trade or business is the 
presence of a profit motive.  In the context of a tax-exempt organization, the U.S. Supreme Court 
declared that the inquiry should be whether the activity “‘was entered into with the dominant 
41 Portions of this discussion on unrelated business income are extracted from the author’s previously published 
article, The Taxation of Cause-Related Marketing, 85 CHI-KENT L. REV. 883 (2010). 
42  All references to the “Code” are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. 
 
43  See I.R.C. § 511. 
 
44  Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a). 
  
45  I.R.C. § 513(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b). 
 
46  I.R.C. § 513(a). 
47  Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b).   
48 Comm’r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987). 
49 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b).  But see La. Credit Union League v. United States, 693 F.2d 525, 542 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(“[T]he presence or absence of competition between exempt and nonexempt organizations does not determine 
whether an unrelated trade or business is to be taxed.”). 
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hope and intent of realizing a profit.’”50  Significant weight is given to objective factors such as 
whether the activity is similar to profit-making activities conducted by commercial enterprises.51 
When the activity involved is highly profitable and involves little risk, courts generally infer the 
presence of a profit motive.52  The mere fact that the activity is conducted as a fund-raising 
activity of the charity is not sufficient to conclude that the activity is not a trade or business.53 
 
2. Regularly Carried On Requirement.  In general, in determining whether a trade or 
business is “regularly carried on,” one must consider the frequency and continuity with which 
the activities productive of income are conducted, and the manner in which they are pursued.  
Business activities are deemed to be “‘regularly carried on’ if they manifest a frequency and 
continuity, and are pursued in a manner, generally similar to comparable commercial activities of 
nonexempt organizations.”54  For example, “[w]here income producing activities are of a kind 
normally conducted by nonexempt commercial organizations on a year-round basis, the conduct 
of such activities by an exempt organization over a period of only a few weeks does not 
constitute the regular carrying on of trade or business [sic].”55  Similarly, “income producing or 
fund raising activities lasting only a short period of time will not ordinarily be treated as 
regularly carried on if they recur only occasionally or sporadically.”56  However, “[w]here 
income producing activities are of a kind normally undertaken by nonexempt commercial 
organizations only on a seasonal basis, the conduct of such activities by an exempt organization 
during a significant portion of the season ordinarily constitutes the regular conduct of trade or 
business.”57   
 
 In making this determination, it is essential to identify the appropriate nonexempt 
commercial counterpart to the exempt organization’s activity, because the manner in which the 
nonexempt commercial counterpart conducts its similar activities has an important bearing on 
whether the activity is considered to be carried on year-round, on a seasonal basis or 
intermittently.  For example, a tax-exempt organization’s annual Christmas card sales program 
was determined to be regularly carried on when conducted over several months during the 
holiday season because, although nonexempt organizations normally conduct the sale of greeting 
cards year-round, the Christmas card portion of the nonexempt organizations’ sales was 
50  United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 110, n. 1 (1986) (quoting Brannen v. Comm’r, 722 F.2d 
695, 704 (11th Cir. 1984).   
51  Ill. Ass’n of Prof’l Ins. Agents v. Comm’r, 801 F.2d 987, 992 (7th Cir. 1986). 
52  See, e.g., Carolinas Farm & Power Equip. Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 699 F.2d 167, 170 (4th Cir. 1983) 
(“[T]here is no better objective measure of an organization’s motive for conducting an activity than the ends it 
achieves.”); La. Credit Union League v. United States, 693 F.2d 525, 533 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that a profit 
motive existed based on the fact that the organization was extensively involved in endorsing and administering an 
insurance program that proved highly profitable); Fraternal Order of Police Ill. State Troopers Lodge No. 41 v. 
Comm’r, 87 T.C. 747, 756 (1986), aff’d, 833 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1987) (reasoning that the organization’s advertising 
activities were “obviously conducted with a profit motive” because the activities were highly lucrative and with no 
risk or expense to the organization). 
53  See Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 115 (stating that a charity cannot escape taxation by characterizing an 
activity as fundraising, because otherwise “any exempt organization could engage in a tax-free business by ‘giving 
away’ its product in return for a ‘contribution’ equal to the market value of the product”). 
54  Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(1). 
55  Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(i).   
56  Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(iii).   
57  Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(i). 
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conducted over the same seasonal period.58  By contrast, when an exempt organization’s 
fundraising activities are conducted on an intermittent basis, such activities are generally 
considered not to be regularly carried on.59 
 
 Furthermore, in determining whether an exempt organization’s business activities are 
“regularly carried on,” the activities of the organization’s agents may be taken into account.60  
Courts disagree as to whether an exempt organization’s preparation time in organizing and 
developing an income-producing activity may be taken into account.61   
 
3. Unrelated to the Charity’s Exempt Purpose.  In the event the charity’s activities are 
determined to be regularly carried on, the next inquiry is whether such activities are related to the 
charity’s purposes which constitute the basis for its exemption.62  This in an inherently factual 
determination.  To determine whether the business activity is “related,” the relationship between 
the conduct of the business activities that generate the income and the accomplishment of the 
organization’s exempt purposes must be examined to determine whether a causal relationship 
exists.63  The activity will not be substantially related merely because the income produced from 
the activity is used to further the organization’s exempt purposes.64  Rather, the inquiry focuses 
on the manner in which the income is earned.  Thus, a substantial causal relationship exists if the 
distribution of the goods from which the income is derived contributes importantly to the 
accomplishment of the organization’s exempt purposes.65  In each case, the determination of 
whether this relationship exists depends on the facts and circumstances involved.  In making this 
determination, the size and extent of the activities involved are considered in relation to the 
nature and extent of the exempt functions they are serving.66  If the activities are conducted on a 
58  Veterans of Foreign Wars, Dept. of Mich. v. Comm’r, 89 T.C. 7, 32-37 (1987).   
59  See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(iii) (stating fundraising activities lasting only a short period of time will generally 
not be regarded as regularly carried on, despite their recurrence or their manner of conduct); Suffolk County 
Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n, Inc. v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 1314 (1981), acq., 1984-2 C.B. 2 (determining that the 
conduct of an annual vaudeville show one weekend per year and the solicitation and publication of advertising in the 
related program guide which lasted eight to sixteen weeks per year was intermittent and not regularly carried on).  
Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(ii) (“[E]xempt organization business activities which are engaged in only 
discontinuously or periodically will not be considered regularly carried on if they are conducted without the 
competitive and promotional efforts typical of commercial endeavors.”) 
 
60  State Police Ass’n of Mass. v. Comm’r, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 582 (1996), aff’d, 125 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997).   
61  See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 456 (1989) (finding that NCAA’s sale of advertisements 
for annual championship program was “regularly carried on,” in part because of the amount of preliminary time 
spent to solicit advertisements and prepare them for publication), rev’d, 914 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that 
this activity was not regularly carried on, because only the time spent conducting the activity, not the time spent in 
preparations, is relevant to that determination); A.O.D. 1991-015 (indicating that the IRS will continue to litigate the 
issue). 
62  See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(1).   
 
63  Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(1). 
 
64  I.R.C. § 513(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(1). 
 
65  Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2). 
 
66  See I.R.C. § 511. 
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scale larger than is reasonably necessary to accomplish the exempt purposes, the income 
attributed to the excess activities constitutes unrelated business income.67   
 
B. Exceptions and Modifications.  The term “unrelated trade or business” is subject to 
several exceptions under which certain businesses that may otherwise constitute unrelated 
businesses are removed from the scope of the tax.  In particular, the term “unrelated trade or 
business” does not include a trade or business in which substantially all the work in carrying on 
the trade or business is performed for an organization without compensation.68  Unlike the other 
exceptions, the “volunteer exception” is not restricted as to the nature of the businesses to which 
it pertains.  In addition, the term “unrelated trade or business” does not include the trade or 
business of selling merchandise, substantially all of which has been received by the organization 
as gifts or contributions.69 
1. Passive Activities Generally.  The purpose of the unrelated business income tax is to 
eliminate the conduct of unrelated businesses by tax exempt organizations as a source of unfair 
competition with for-profit companies.  To the extent that income of a tax exempt organization is 
derived from investment and other passive activities, the taxation of such income is not 
necessary to accomplish this goal.  Accordingly, the modifications to the unrelated business 
income tax exclude most passive income, as well as the deductions associated with such passive 
income, from the scope of the tax.70  In particular, the following types of passive income are 








iv. payments with respect to securities loans;74 
 
v. amounts received or accrued as consideration for entering into agreements to make 
loans;75 
 
vi. royalties;76  
 
67  Id. 
68  I.R.C. § 513(a)(1). 
69  I.R.C. § 513(a)(3). 
70  See generally Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578 (1924). 
71  I.R.C. § 512(b)(1).   
72  I.R.C. § 512(b)(1). 
73  I.R.C. § 512(b)(1). 
74  I.R.C. § 512(b)(1).  The term “payments with respect to securities loans,” refers to income derived from a 
securities lending transaction in which an exempt organization loans securities from its portfolio to a broker in 
exchange for collateral.  I.R.C. § 512(a)(5).  Payments derived from a securities lending transaction typically include 
interest earned on the collateral and dividends or interest paid on the loaned securities while in the possession of the 
broker. 
75  I.R.C. § 512(b)(1). 
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vii. gains or losses from the sale, exchange, or other disposition of property other than 
inventory;77 and 
 
viii. gains or losses recognized in connection with a charitable organization’s investment 
activities from the lapse or termination of options to buy or sell securities or real 
property.78 
 
2. Royalties.  Because royalties are passive in nature, the receipt of royalty income by a tax-
exempt organization does not result in unfair competition with taxable entities.79 Accordingly, 
section 512 of the Code provides that a charity’s UBTI generally does not include royalties.80 A 
royalty is defined as a payment that relates to the use of a valuable right, such as a name, 
trademark, trade name, or copyright.81 The royalty may be in the form of a fixed fee or a 
percentage of sales of the products utilizing the charity’s IP. In addition, the tax-exempt 
organization may retain the right to approve the use of its IP by the licensee without changing the 
determination that the income from the transaction is a royalty. 
 
 Of particular importance in the royalty context is the amount of services the charity 
performs in exchange for the payment received. In order to maintain the royalty exemption for 
the payments received, the charity may not perform more than de minimis services in connection 
with the arrangement.82 If the charity performs more than insubstantial services, then the income 
received is considered compensation for personal services, the royalty exception would not 
apply, and the income would most likely be subject to tax as UBTI.83 
 
 For example, the Internal Revenue Service privately ruled that royalties received by a 
charity from the license of the charity’s intellectual property to a for-profit company for use in 
the company’s commercial activities were excluded from the charity’s UBTI under the royalty 
exception.84 Under the license agreement, the charity retained the right to review the designs and 
proposed uses of the charity’s intellectual property, inspect the commercial counterpart’s 
facilities where the product was manufactured, and inspect the commercial counterpart’s books 
and records annually. The Internal Revenue Service determined that these services performed by 
the charity in connection with the licensing arrangement were de minimis. Moreover, the 
licensing agreement was narrowly tailored to protect the charity’s ownership of its intellectual 
property by giving the charity absolute discretion to reject proposed uses of the property, 
providing notice on every unit displaying the charity’s mark that it was used with the charity’s 
permission, and allowing the charity to approve and limit mass media advertising of the product. 
76  I.R.C. § 512(b)(2).  A royalty is defined as a payment that relates to the use of a valuable right, such as a name, 
trademark, trade name or copyright.  Rev. Rul. 81-178, 1981-2 C.B. 135.  By contrast, the payment for personal 
services does not constitute a royalty.  Id. 
77  I.R.C. § 512(b)(5). 
78  I.R.C. § 512(b)(5). 
79  See Sierra Club Inc. v. Comm’r, 86 F.3d 1526, 1533 (9th Cir. 1996). 
80  I.R.C. § 512(b)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-1(b). A charity’s UBTI would include royalties derived from debt-
financed property. Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-1(b). 
81  Rev. Rul. 81-178, 1981-2 C.B. 135. 
82  Sierra Club, 86 F.3d at 1533–35. 
83  See Rev. Rul. 81-178. 
84  Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200601033 (Oct. 14, 2005). 
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The Internal Revenue Service concluded that the income that the charity would receive from the 
arrangement was “vastly out of proportion with the time and effort” the charity would expend. 
Therefore, it could only be compensation for the use of the charity’s intellectual property. 
 
 The determination of the permissible amount of “insubstantial services” is uncertain, 
however, especially in connection with the charitable organization’s exercise of quality control 
over the use of its IP by a licensee. As is prudent business practice, a charity would want to 
maintain quality control over the use of its IP by the licensee under the licensing agreement. In 
some cases, the Internal Revenue Service has determined that “mere” quality control does not 
constitute more than insubstantial services related to the royalty income.85 In other cases, a 
charity’s “quality control” was recharacterized as services, resulting in the income from the 
arrangement being taxed as compensation from services rather than exempted as royalty 
income.86  Therefore, charities are left to struggle with the determination of the permissible types 
of “quality control” they can include in their licensing agreements without crossing the boundary 
between de minimis and substantial services. 
 
 Furthermore, caution should be taken in relying on the royalty exception for income 
received from the licensing of a charity’s name or logo for placement on a commercial product.  
In evaluating the justification for the continued tax exemption for college athletic programs, the 
Congressional Budget Office recommended repealing the royalty exception to the extent that it 
applies to the licensing of a charity’s name or logo: 
 
Some types of royalty income may reasonably be considered more commercial than 
others. . . . [W]hen colleges and universities license team names, mottoes, and other 
trademarks to for-profit businesses that supply apparel, accessories, and credit cards to 
the general public, they approve each product and use of their symbols and, in some 
cases, exchange information, such as donor lists, with the licensees to aid in their 
marketing. . . . The manufacture or sale of such items would clearly be commercial—and 
subject to the UBIT—if undertaken directly by the schools. Schools’ active involvement 
in generating licensing income could be the basis for considering such income as 
commercial and therefore subject to the UBTI. . . . 
 
Bringing royalty income that accrues only to athletic departments under the UBIT would 
be problematic, however . . . . [I]f royalty income from licensing team names to for-
profit businesses was truly considered commercial and subject to the UBIT, the same 
arguments would apply in full force to licensing all other university names and 
trademarks. A consistent policy would subject all such income to the UBIT because of 
its commercial nature. Such a change in policy could affect many other nonprofits in 
addition to colleges and universities . . . .87 
 
C. Public Disclosure of Information Relating to the Unrelated Business Income Tax.  
Charitable organizations are required to make their annual Form 990/Form 990PF information 
returns and exemption materials available for public inspection.88  Organizations that have 
unrelated business income also have to file a Form 990-T return.  Charitable organizations 
85  See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 81-178, 1981-2 C.B. 135; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200601033 (Oct. 14, 2005); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9029047 
(Apr. 27, 1990) 
86  See, e.g., NCAA v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 456, 468–70 (1989), rev’d on other grounds, 914 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 
1990); Fraternal Order of Police v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 747, 758 (1986), aff’d, 833 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1987). 
87  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 3005, TAX PREFERENCES FOR COLLEGIATE SPORTS 13 (2009). 
88  I.R.C. § 6104(d)(1)(A). 
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described in Section 501(c)(3)89 are required to make their Form 990-T returns90 available for 
public inspection.91  Certain information may be withheld by the charitable organization from 
public disclosure and inspection (e.g., information relating to a trade secret, patent, process, style 
of work, or apparatus of the charitable organization) if the Secretary determines that public 
disclosure of such information would adversely affect the charitable organization.92  Under the 
commensurate in scope test, an exempt organization may generate a significant amount of UBTI 
so long as it performs charitable programs that are commensurate in scope with its financial 
resources.93  However, if a substantial portion of the charity’s income is from unrelated 
activities, the organization fails to qualify for exemption.94 
 
D. Effect of Unrelated Business Activities on the Charity’s Tax-Exempt Status.  In order to 
obtain and maintain tax-exempt status, a charity must be operated primarily for the purposes 
described in Section 501(c)(3) of the Code.  Accordingly, if a charity engages in too much 
unrelated business activity, it risks the loss of its tax-exempt status as no longer satisfying this 
operational test.  There is no bright line rule with respect to how much unrelated business income 
a charity may receive without jeopardizing its tax-exempt status.95  Whether an organization has 
a substantial non-exempt purpose is a question of fact.96 
 
E. Use of Taxable Subsidiaries.  If a charity engages in an activity that may produce 
substantial unrelated business income, the charity should consider conducting the activity 
through a taxable corporate subsidiary wholly owned by the charity.  The taxable subsidiary will 
be responsible for paying income tax on the net taxable income from the activity.  The net 
income may then be distributed to the charity in the form of dividends which generally are 
excluded from a charity’s UBTI. 
 
 One advantage of this structure is that the activities of the taxable subsidiary normally 
will not be attributed to the charity.  This is especially important if the conduct of the activity is 
so substantial that it may jeopardize the charity’s tax-exemption.  Second, the charity will not be 
required to file a Form 990-T related to the activity, which is available for public inspection.  
Although the taxable subsidiary will file a Form 1120, such form is not required to be made 
89 This requirement applies to all charitable organizations which file Form 990-T returns, regardless of whether such 
organizations are also required to file annual Form 990/Form 990PF information returns.  However, state colleges 
and universities which are exempt from income tax solely under Section 115 of the Code are not required to make 
their Form 990-T returns available for public inspection.  Notice 2007-45, 2007-22 I.R.B. 1320. 
90 An exact copy of the Form 990-T return, including all schedules, attachments and supporting documents must be 
disclosed.  Notice 2007-45, 2007-22 I.R.B. 1320. 
91  I.R.C. § 6104(d)(1)(A)(ii). 
92 Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax’n, 109th Cong., Technical Explanation of H.R. 4, The “Pension Protection Act of 
2006,” JCX-38-06 (Aug. 3, 2006) at 330. 
93  Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. 186. 
94  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1). 
95 In making this determination, courts may examine the amount of time or money spent on carrying out an 
unrelated trade or business.  See Orange County Agricultural Society v. Comm’r, 893 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1990), aff'g 
55 T.C.M. 1602 (1988) (denying exempt status where an organization received approximately one-third of its gross 
income from unrelated business activities). 
96  See Better Business Bureau of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945) (holding that the 
presence of a single, non-exempt purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy exemption regardless of the number 
of importance of truly exempt purposes); B.S.W. Group v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 352 (1978); Nationalist 
Movement v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 558, 559 (1994), aff'd, 37 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 1994). 
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publicly available.  Third, use of a taxable subsidiary can protect the charity’s assets from 
liabilities arising from the conduct of the unrelated business activity and isolate those liabilities 
to the taxable subsidiary.  Finally, a taxable subsidiary can provide greater flexibility in 
structuring the unrelated business activity. 
 
 However, use of a taxable subsidiary may increase administrative burdens and costs of 
the charity.  Additionally, the dividends from the taxable subsidiary may no longer be exempt 
from UBIT if the charity transfers debt-financed property to the taxable subsidiary.97  If the 
charity provides administrative services to its taxable subsidiary for a fee, the IRS may reallocate 
income between the charity and the taxable subsidiary under Code section 482.  Finally, if the 
charity receives interest, rent, annuity payments or royalties from its controlled taxable 
subsidiary, such payment may be treated as unrelated business income to the charity to the extent 
the payment reduces the trade or business income of the taxable subsidiary.98 
 
VI. Application of Unrelated Business Income Tax to Cause-Related Marketing.99  When a 
charity engages in a cause-related marketing alliance, the charity must carefully structure the 
alliance or the income the charity receives from the alliance may be treated as unrelated business 
income.  Many cause-related marketing alliances involve recognition of the corporate partner’s 
participation by the charity on its website and in print materials. Thus, this section first analyzes 
the possible application of the corporate sponsorship rules to cause-related marketing alliances. 
Cause-related marketing alliances also involve payment for the use of the charity’s name, logo, 
or trademark; accordingly, this section next analyzes the application of the royalty exception to 
cause-related marketing alliances. Finally, because consumer perception of product endorsement 
by the charity might be considered as a factor in the UBTI analysis, this section analyzes whether 
the income received from cause-related marketing alliances could be included in UBTI as 
advertising income. 
 
A. Corporate Sponsorship Rules in General.  Under section 513(i) of the Internal Revenue 
Code, the receipt of qualified sponsorship payments by a charity does not constitute the receipt 
of income from an unrelated trade or business, and instead, the payment is treated as a charitable 
contribution to the charity.100 A “qualified sponsorship payment” is “any payment101 by any 
person engaged in a trade or business with respect to which there is no arrangement or 
97 I.R.C. § 357(c); Rev. Rul. 77-71, 1977-1 C.B. 155. 
 
98  I.R.C. § 512(b)(13). 
99 Portions of this discussion on cause-related marketing are extracted from the author’s previously published article, 
The Taxation of Cause-Related Marketing, 85 CHI-KENT L. REV. 883 (2010). 
100  I.R.C. § 513(i); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(a). The Treasury Regulations provide the following example of a qualified 
sponsorship payment: 
M, a local charity, organizes a marathon and walkathon at which it serves to participants drinks and 
other refreshments provided free of charge by a national corporation. The corporation also gives M 
prizes to be awarded to the winners of the event. M recognizes the assistance of the corporation by 
listing the corporation’s name in promotional fliers, in newspaper advertisements of the event and on 
T-shirts worn by participants. M changes the name of its event to include the name of the corporation. 
M’s activities constitute acknowledgement of the sponsorship. 
Id. § 1.513-4(f), example 1. 
101  “Payment” means “the payment of money, transfer of property, or performance of services.” Id. § 1.513-4(c)(1). 
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expectation that the person will receive any substantial return benefit.”102 A “substantial return 
benefit” is any benefit other than a “use or acknowledgement”103 of the corporate sponsor and 
certain disregarded benefits.104 Substantial benefits include the charitable organization’s 
provision of facilities, services, or other privileges to the sponsor; exclusive provider 
relationships;105 and any license to use intangible assets of the charitable organization.106 “If 
there is an arrangement or expectation that the payor will receive a substantial return benefit with 
respect to any payment, then only the portion, if any, of the payment that exceeds the fair market 
value of the substantial return benefit is a qualified sponsorship payment.”107 The exempt 
organization has the burden of establishing the fair market value of the substantial return benefit. 
If the organization fails to do so, “no portion of the payment constitutes a qualified sponsorship 
payment.”108 
 
 The tax treatment of any payment that does not represent income from a qualified 
sponsorship payment is governed by general UBIT principles.109 The mere fact that the payments 
are received in connection with the corporate sponsor receiving a substantial return benefit does 
not necessitate the payments constituting UBTI. For example, in a memorandum released by the 
Internal Revenue Service in October 2001, examples of certain exclusive provider relationships 
were addressed.110 Significantly, one example involved a contract between a soft drink company 
and a university, under which the soft drink company would be the exclusive provider of soft 
drinks on campus in return for an annual payment made to the university. Exclusive provider 
relationships are explicitly named as a substantial return benefit; therefore, the arrangement did 
not qualify as a qualified sponsorship payment. Because the soft drink company maintained the 
vending machines, there was no obligation by the university to perform any services on behalf of 
the soft drink company or to perform any services in connection with the contract. Accordingly, 
the university did not have the level of activity necessary to constitute a trade or business. Since 
the contract also provided that the soft drink company was given a license to market its products 
102  Id. For purposes of these rules, it is irrelevant whether the sponsored activity is temporary or permanent. Id 
103  The permitted “uses or acknowledgements” under the qualified sponsorship payment rules include (i) “logos and 
slogans that do not contain qualitative or comparative descriptions of the payor’s products, services, facilities or 
company,” (ii) “a list of the payor’s locations, telephone numbers, or Internet address,” (iii) “value-neutral 
descriptions, including displays or visual depictions, of the payor’s product-line or services,” and (iv) “the payor’s 
brand or trade names and product or service listings.” Id. § 1.513-4(c)(1)(iv). “Logos or slogans that are an 
established part of the payor’s identity are not considered to contain qualitative or comparative descriptions.” Id. 
104  Id. § 1.513-4(c)(2). A benefit is disregarded if “the aggregate fair market value of all the benefits provided to the 
payor or persons designated by the payor in connection with the payment during the organization’s taxable year is 
not more than two percent of the amount of the payment.” Id. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(ii). If this limit is exceeded, the entire 
benefit (and not just the amount exceeding the two percent threshold) provided to the payor is a substantial return 
benefit. Id. 
105 The Treasury Regulations define an “exclusive provider” relationship as any arrangement which “limits the sale, 
distribution, availability, or use of competing products, services or facilities in connection with an exempt 
organization’s activity.” Id. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(vi)(B). “For example, if in exchange for a payment, the exempt 
organization agrees to allow only the payor’s products to be sold in connection with an activity, the payor has 
received a substantial return benefit.” Id. 
106  Id. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(iii)(D). 
107  Id. § 1.513-4(d). 
108  Id. 
109  Id. § 1.513-4(f). 
110 See IRS Issues Field Memo on Exclusive Providers and UBIT, 2001 TAX NOTES TODAY 192-26 (Oct. 3, 2001). 
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using the university’s name and logo, the portion of the total payment attributable to the value of 
the license would be excluded from the university’s UBTI as a royalty payment. 
 
 If the corporate sponsorship involves the charity’s endorsement of the corporate 
sponsor’s product or services, then the income from the corporate sponsorship will likely be 
included in the charity’s UBTI as advertising income.  “Advertising” is “any message or other 
programming material which is broadcast or otherwise transmitted, published, displayed or 
distributed, and which promotes or markets any trade or business, or any service, facility or 
product.”111 Advertising includes “messages containing qualitative or comparative language, 
price information or other indications of savings or value, an endorsement, or an inducement to 
purchase, sell, or use any company, service, facility or product.”112 For example, the Internal 
Revenue Service considers the following messages to consist, at least in part, of advertising: (i) 
“This program has been brought to you by the Music Shop, located at 123 Main Street. For your 
music needs, give them a call at 555-1234. This station is proud to have the Music Shop as a 
sponsor,”113 and (ii) “Visit the Music Shop today for the finest selection of music CDs and 
cassette tapes.”114 If a single message contains both advertising and an acknowledgement, the 
message is an advertisement. Where the Treasury Regulations do not allow one to clearly 
distinguish between advertisements and permitted uses and acknowledgements, a court may be 
inclined to take a common-sense approach and consider a message an advertisement if it “looks 
like” an ad.115 
 
 The United States Supreme Court considered whether advertising could be substantially 
related to an organization’s exempt purposes in United States v. American College of 
Physicians,116 the leading case on this topic. There, an exempt physicians’ organization received 
income from the sale of advertising in its professional journal. The messages in question 
consisted of advertisements for “pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and equipment useful in the 
practice of internal medicine.” The organization “has a long-standing practice of accepting only 
advertisements containing information about the use of medical products, and screens proffered 
111 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(v). 
112 Id. Typically, advertising is considered to be a trade or business that is unrelated to the charity’s exempt 
purposes. Thus, the question remains whether the advertising activity is “regularly carried on.” If advertising 
messages of a corporate sponsor’s product are continuously present on the charity’s website, such advertising 
activities would seem to be regularly carried on and the revenues therefrom would thus constitute UBTI. One 
counter-argument would appear to be that the limited number of advertisements makes the charity’s activities 
dissimilar in extent to comparable commercial activities. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 9417003 (Dec. 31, 1993) (stating 
that an advertising campaign conducted by placing advertisements in programs for an organization’s annual ball was 
not typical of commercial endeavors because solicitations for advertisements were limited in number and consisted 
of a single form letter). Given the variety and relative novelty of Internet advertisements, it would be unwise for a 
charity to rely upon such a position. See generally I.R.S. Announcement 2000-84, 2000-42 I.R.B. 385 (announcing 
that the Internal Revenue Service was considering whether clarification was needed as to the application of the 
“regularly carried on” requirement to business activities conducted on the Internet). 
113  Id. § 1.513-4(f), example 7. 
114 Id. at example 8. Where a document can be broken down into segments identified in the Treasury Regulations, a 
court or the Internal Revenue Service will likely analyze each segment with reference to the rules set out above. See, 
e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 9805001 (Oct. 7, 1997) (concluding that an “ad” did not rise to the level of advertising when 
it consisted of a can of a sponsor’s pet food made to look like a trophy and included two slogans that had long been 
used by the sponsor in its advertising). 
115 See, e.g., State Police Ass’n of Mass. v. Comm’r, 125 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997). 
116 475 U.S. 834 (1986). 
Texas Tax Lawyer - Spring 2015
advertisements for accuracy and relevance to internal medicine.” The organization argued that 
these advertisements were substantially related to its exempt functions because they contributed 
to the education of the journal’s readers. At trial, experts testified that “drug advertising performs 
a valuable function for doctors by disseminating information on recent developments in drug 
manufacture and use.”117 Rejecting the organization’s claim and ruling that the advertising 
income was UBTI, the Supreme Court analyzed this issue as follows: 
 
[A]ll advertisements contain some information, and if a modicum of informative content 
were enough to supply the important contribution necessary to achieve tax exemption for 
commercial advertising, it would be the rare advertisement indeed that would fail to 
meet the test. Yet the statutory and regulatory scheme, even if not creating a per se rule 
against tax exemption, is clearly antagonistic to the concept of a per se rule for 
exemption . . . . Thus, the Claims Court properly directed its attention to the College’s 
conduct of its advertising business, and it found the following pertinent facts: 
 
The evidence is clear that plaintiff did not use the advertising to provide its readers a 
comprehensive or systematic presentation of any aspect of the goods or services 
publicized. Those companies willing to pay for advertising space got it; others did 
not. Moreover, some of the advertising was for established drugs or devices and was 
repeated from one month to another, undermining the suggestion that the advertising 
was principally designed to alert readers of recent developments . . . . Some ads even 
concerned matters that had no conceivable relationship to the College’s tax-exempt 
purposes. 
 
. . . This is not to say that the College could not control its publication of advertisements 
in such a way as to reflect an intention to contribute importantly to its educational 
functions. By coordinating the content of the advertisements with the editorial content of 
the issue, or by publishing only advertisements reflecting new developments in the 
pharmaceutical market, for example, perhaps the College could satisfy the stringent 
standards erected by Congress and the Treasury.118 
 
B. Corporate sponsorship rules do not (fully) address the issue.  The corporate sponsorship 
rules were enacted to address the situation where the charity uses the corporate sponsor’s logo on 
the charity’s materials. Cause-related marketing alliances typically involve the use of the 
charity’s name or logo on the corporate partner’s products. At first blush, the corporate 
sponsorship exception seemingly would not apply to cause-related marketing. However, cause-
related marketing alliances often involve the charity’s recognition of the alliance by 
acknowledging the corporate partner on the charity’s website or print materials. Therefore, a 
charity may claim that at least a portion of the payment received is a “sponsorship payment” and 
attempt to treat that portion separately from the other revenue received from the cause-related 
marketing alliance. In particular, this may be the case where the alliance guarantees the charity a 
117 Id. at 847. 
118  Id. at 848–50 (citation omitted). Several cases and rulings follow the reasoning of American College of 
Physicians. See, e.g., Minn. Holstein-Frisian Breeders Ass’n v. Comm’r, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1319 (1992) (holding 
that advertisements that may have been of “incidental benefit to breeders in running their day-to-day operations” but 
that did not “contribute importantly to improving the quality of the breed of Holstein-Friesian cattle” were not 
substantially related to a cattle breeding organization’s exempt purposes); Fla. Trucking Ass’n v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 
1039 (1986) (holding that advertisements of products of particular interest to the trucking industry did not bear a 
substantial relationship to the exempt functions of a trucking trade association); Rev. Rul. 82-139, 1982-2 C.B. 108 
(concluding that a bar association’s publication of advertisements for products and services used by the legal 
profession was not substantially related to the association’s exempt purposes). 
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minimum “contribution” from the corporate partner from the sale of the promotional 
merchandise. 
 
 In order for a sponsorship payment received by a charity to be excluded from the 
charity’s UBTI as a qualified sponsorship payment, the affiliation cannot provide a substantial 
return benefit to the corporate partner.119  Since cause-related marketing alliances grant the 
corporate partner a license to use the charity’s name and logo on the product, such a right would 
be a substantial return benefit.120 Nonetheless, the portion, if any, of the payment that exceeds 
the fair market value of the license to use the charity’s name or logo may still be a qualified 
sponsorship payment.121  
 
 In conjunction with the corporate partner’s use of the charity’s name or logo, the charity 
may acknowledge the affiliation on the charity’s website or printed materials. Depending on how 
the charity describes its affiliation with the corporate partner, the “use or acknowledgement” 
exception may not apply. The display of the logos and/or slogans of the corporate partners are 
“uses or acknowledgements.” The provision of hyperlinks to various sponsors’ Internet sites also 
constitutes merely “uses or acknowledgements,” provided the sponsor’s Internet site does not 
contain additional statements indicating that the charity promotes the sponsor or its products or 
services.122  However, the provision of the hyperlink to the sponsor’s website by the charity may 
be for the purpose of encouraging consumers to purchase the merchandise from the sponsor 
because the proceeds from those sales benefit the charity. Since the corporate sponsorship rules 
were not designed with cause-related marketing activities in mind, they do not address whether 
the charity’s motivation in providing the link to the partner’s website should be taken into 
account in determining whether the charity is promoting the sponsor’s products or services. 
 
C. Use of the charity’s name or logo may (or may not) fit within the royalty exception.  
Based on the success of taxpayers in establishing royalty treatment for payments for the use of 
the charity’s name and logo in the affinity card context,123 it would seem that the payments 
received by a charity for the licensing of their name, logo, and trademarks in connection with the 
sale of the merchandise by the corporate partner should also be considered royalties and thus 
exempt from the charity’s UBTI. This result presupposes that the charity is not performing more 
than an insubstantial amount of services in connection with the licensing of the charity’s name, 
logo, and trademarks. If the charity performs more than insubstantial services, then the income 
119 See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(1). 
120 A “substantial return benefit” is any benefit other than a “use or acknowledgement” of the corporate sponsor.  
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(2).  Importantly, substantial benefits include any license to use intangible assets of the 
charitable organization.  Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(iii). 
121 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(iv). 
122  Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(f), examples 11 & 12; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200303062 (Oct. 22, 2002). 
123 See, e.g., Or. State Univ. Alumni Ass’n v. Comm’r, 193 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999); Common Cause v. Comm’r, 
112 T.C. 332 (1999); Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1569 (1999); Miss. State Univ. Alumni, Inc. v. 
Comm’r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 458 (1997).  Generally, an affinity credit card arrangement provides that a credit card 
company may use the exempt organization’s name in connection with a credit card, and the organization will receive 
a certain percentage, or “royalty,” from the income generated by the credit card.  Based on such cases, the Internal 
Revenue Manual now indicates that the Internal Revenue Service will consider payments under affinity credit card 
arrangements royalties as long as only minimal services are provided by the exempt organization’s members or 
employees. See I.R.S., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 7.27.6.7.3 (CCH 1999). 
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received is considered compensation for personal services, the royalty exception would not 
apply, and the income would most likely be subject to tax as UBTI.124 
 
 However, the law is not clear that the use of the charity’s name or logo on the corporate 
partner’s products fits within the royalty exception. If the charity’s name or logo is placed on the 
corporate partner’s product, the payment could instead be viewed as received in connection with 
the joint advertisement of the product.125  Especially relevant in this analysis is consumer 
perception of apparent endorsement of the product by the charity because the charity has allowed 
its name and logo to be placed on the product without qualification. Although the licensing 
agreement and official position of the charity may state that the charity does not endorse the 
product, the charity normally retains the right to approve how its name and logo are used on the 
product. By approving the placement of its name and logo on the product, the charity may be 
held to the reasonable impressions such cause-related marketing leaves in the minds of 
consumers. If the charity’s name and logo are used in such a way as to give consumers the 
impression that the charity endorses the product, the charity may be deemed to have endorsed the 
product. If the Internal Revenue Service looks beyond the explicit terms of the agreement to the 
manner in which the agreement is carried out, the payment may be considered advertising 
income received by the charity and may no longer be excluded from the charity’s UBTI. 
 
D. Revenue from cause-related marketing may be advertising.  Both the courts and the 
Internal Revenue Service generally consider the publication and distribution of advertising by a 
charity to be unrelated to the accomplishment of the charity’s exempt purposes.126  If the charity 
conducts advertising activities on a regular basis, then the advertising income generally is taxable 
as unrelated business income. 
 
 Generally, displaying the charity’s name or logo on the advertisement likely would not be 
sufficient to cause the advertising to be substantially related to the charity’s exempt purposes. 
Although there are no rulings or other primary authorities considering receipts from 
advertisements bearing an exempt organization’s name or logo, the Internal Revenue Service has 
considered receipts from the direct sale of items bearing an exempt organization’s name or logo.  
If the inclusion of the charity’s name or logo on items directly sold by the charity would not 
prevent receipts from constituting UBTI, then a fortiori, there is little reason to suppose that 
receipts from advertisements of a third party’s products or services which contain the charity’s 
name or logo would not constitute UBTI. However, as discussed above, the Internal Revenue 
Service has on occasion reached a contrary conclusion regarding the sale of t-shirts and similar 
items bearing an organization’s name or symbol, where additional facts demonstrated how the 
items furthered the organization’s exempt function. If such additional facts are present—for 
example, if the items advertised displayed the charity’s message—this would be a positive 
124 See Sierra Club Inc. v. Comm’r, 86 F.3d 1526, 1532 (9th Cir. 1996). 
125 Whether the placement of a charity’s name or logo on a corporate partner’s product is a joint advertisement is a 
fact specific determination. In some cases, the association between the charity’s mission and the corporate partner’s 
product is such that it would be clear the charity is not impliedly endorsing the corporate partner’s product. In other 
cases, the charity’s mission and the corporate partner’s product are so closely aligned that it is unclear whether the 
charity endorses the corporate partner’s product. The issue is prevalent because the most successful cause-related 
marketing alliances occur when the charity’s mission and corporate partner’s products are closely aligned. 
126 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(iv), example 7; United States v. Am. College of Physicians , 475 U.S. 834 
(1986). 
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factor. Note, though, that the positive rulings would still not be directly applicable to receipts 
obtained from a sponsor for advertising a product. One would need to closely examine all of the 
facts and circumstances to determine the extent to which the advertising activity promoted the 
charity’s message (as opposed to promoting the corporate partner more generally), with 
unpredictable results. 
 
VII. Participation in Joint Ventures.  Charitable organizations may partner with other 
charitable organizations or with for-profit organizations to produce or market an invention or 
copyrighted work.  Participation in these joint ventures affords charitable organizations with 
numerous opportunities, such as to (1) further their exempt purposes, (2) diversify their revenue 
source, and (3) obtain needed capital or expertise in an increasingly competitive economic 
environment.127  While these types of business arrangements can be highly profitable and truly 
beneficial to both the charitable and for-profit organizations involved, there is a serious risk for 
the participating charitable organization.  The failure of the charitable organization to protect its 
charitable assets can lead the loss its federal tax exemption. 
 
A charitable organization may not confer a “private benefit” on persons who are not within 
the charitable class of persons who are intended to benefit from the organization’s operations, 
unless the private benefit is purely incidental.  The purpose of the private benefit limitation is to 
ensure that charitable organizations are operated for public purposes because of their special tax 
status.128  The determination of whether the private benefit is more than incidental is based on a 
“balancing test” set forth in a 1987 General Counsel Memorandum: 
 
A private benefit is considered incidental only if it is incidental in both a qualitative and 
a quantitative sense. In order to be incidental in a qualitative sense, the benefit must be a 
necessary concomitant of the activity which benefits the public at large, i.e., the activity 
can be accomplished only by benefiting certain private individuals. To be incidental in a 
quantitative sense, the private benefit must not be substantial after considering the 
overall public benefit conferred by the activity.129 
 
If an organization provides more than incidental private benefit, the organization’s tax-exempt 
status may be revoked.130 
 
127  See generally Nicholas A. Mirkay, Relinquish Control! Why the IRS Should Change Its Stance on Exempt 
Organizations in Ancillary Joint Ventures, 6 NEV. L. J. 21 (2005). 
128  See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii). According to the Treasury Regulations, an organization does not qualify 
for exemption 
unless it serves a public rather than a private interest. Thus . . . it is necessary for an organization to 
establish that it is not organized or operated for the benefit of private interests such as designated 
individuals, the creator or his family, shareholders of the organization, or persons controlled, directly or 
indirectly, by such private interests. 
Id. 
129 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987) (citations omitted).  The Internal Revenue Service’s balancing 
test was adopted by the Tax Court in American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989).  
130  For example, the Internal Revenue Service ruled that an organization formed to promote interest in classical 
music was not exempt because its only method of achieving its goal was to support a commercial radio station that 
was in financial difficulty. Rev. Rul. 76-206, 1976-1 C.B. 154. 
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Prior to 1982, a charitable organization automatically ceased to qualify as tax exempt 
under Code Section 501(c)(3) when it served as a general partner in a partnership that included 
private investors as limited partners.  The IRS’s reasoning was that the obligations of the 
charitable general partner to its for-profit limited partners were incompatible with its requirement 
to operate exclusively for charitable purposes.  The IRS’s per se opposition to charitable 
organizations’ involvement in joint ventures with for-profit investors was abandoned, however, 
in 1982, with the issuance of the Plumstead Theatre Society decision. 
 
A. Plumstead Theatre Society v. Commissioner.  In Plumstead, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that a charitable organization’s participation as a general partner in a limited 
partnership involving private investors did not jeopardize its tax exempt status.131  The theatre 
company at question co-produced a play as one of its charitable activities.  Prior to the opening 
of the play, the theatre company encountered financial difficulties in raising its share of costs.132  
In order to meet its funding obligations, the theatre company formed a limited partnership in 
which it served as general partner, and two individuals and a for-profit corporation were the 
limited partners.  The IRS denied tax-exempt status to the theatre company on the grounds that it 
was not operated exclusively for charitable purposes.  Based on the safeguards contained in the 
limited partnership agreement, which served to insulate the theatre company from potential 
conflicts with its exempt purposes, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the IRS, 
holding that the theatre company was operated exclusively for charitable (and educational) 
purposes, and therefore was entitled to tax exemption.  One of the significant factors supporting 
the court’s holding was its finding that the limited partners had no control over the theatre 
company’s operations or over the management of the partnership.133  Another significant factor 
was that the theatre company was not obligated for the return of any capital contribution made by 
the limited partners from the theatre company’s own funds.134   
  
Following its defeat in this landmark court decision, the IRS abandoned its prior per se 
opposition and formulated the basis on which charitable organizations could become general 
partners in joint ventures without violating the terms of their exemption. 
 
B. The IRS’s Two-Part Test for Joint Ventures.  Soon after Plumstead, the IRS issued 
General Counsel Memoranda 39005 in which it set forth the required analysis in testing a 
charitable organization’s participation as a general partner in a limited partnership involving 
private investors.  The IRS used a two-prong “close scrutiny” test to determine the permissibility 
of joint venture arrangements between charitable and for-profit organizations.  The IRS 
reiterated that participation by a charitable organization as a general partner in a limited 
partnership with private investors would not per se endanger its tax exempt status.135  However, 
close scrutiny would be necessary to ensure that the obligations of the charitable organization as 
general partner do not conflict with its ability to pursue exclusively charitable goals.136  
 
131  Plumstead Theatre Society v. Comm’r, 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982) aff’g 74 T.C. 1324 (1980). 
132  Id. 
133  Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200502046 (Oct. 18, 2004). 
134  Id. 
135  Gen. Couns. Mem. 39005 (June 28, 1983). 
136  Id. 
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Thus, in all partnership cases, the initial focus should be on whether the joint venture 
organization furthers a charitable purpose.  Once charitability is established, the 
partnership agreement itself should be examined to see whether the arrangement 
permits the exempt party to act exclusively in furtherance of the purposes for which 
exemption is granted, and not for the benefit of the limited partners.137   
 
The foregoing required a finding that the benefits received by the limited partners are incidental 
to the public purposes served by the partnership.138 
  
In other words, the two-pronged “close scrutiny” test requires that: (1) the activities of the joint 
venture further the charitable purposes of the charitable organization; and (2) the structure of the 
venture insulate the charitable organization from potential conflicts between its charitable 
purposes and its joint venture obligations, and minimizes the likelihood that the arrangement will 
generate private benefit.  If the charitable organization fails to satisfy either test and the activities 
of the joint venture are substantial, the IRS may seek to revoke the charitable organization’s tax 
exemption. 
  
C. Control by the Charitable Organization is a Key Factor.  In evaluating joint ventures 
between charitable organizations and for-profit organizations, the focus of the IRS in applying 
the two-pronged close scrutiny test eventually evolved into a “facts-and-circumstances” 
determination.  This determination focused on whether the charitable organization retained 
sufficient control over the joint venture activities, thereby ensuring that the organization’s own 
charitable purposes were furthered or accomplished through its participation in the joint venture 
and no more than incidental benefit, financial or otherwise, was conferred on the for-profit 
participants.   
 
1. Revenue Ruling 98-15.  Revenue Ruling 98-15 was the first guidance with precedential 
value promulgated by the IRS with respect to joint ventures between charitable organizations and 
for-profit entities.139  The ruling incorporates the two-part close scrutiny test set forth in General 
Counsel Memorandum 39005 with a focus on whether charitable organizations “control” the 
ventures in which they participate.140  The IRS saw the charitable organization’s control of the 
venture as crucial because it provided the charitable organization with an ability to ensure that 
the venture’s activities were exclusively in furtherance of the charitable organization’s exempt 
purposes and served as a safeguard against too much benefit, financial or otherwise, being 
conferred on the for-profit participants. 
  
Revenue Ruling 98-15 describes two scenarios: one “good” and one “bad” joint venture 
involving nonprofit and for-profit healthcare organizations.141  The IRS scrutinizes a variety of 
factors that determine whether the nonprofit has sufficient control over the venture.142  Although 
Revenue Ruling 98-15 lists a number of relevant factors, four factors appear to be most 
137  Id. 
138  Id. 
139  Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 17. 
140  Id.  
141  Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 17. 
142  Id. 
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significant: (1) governance control of the joint venture; (2) control of day-to-day operations of 
the joint venture; (3) management of conflicts of interest between the tax-exempt and for-profit 
participants; and (4) priority of charitable purposes over profit motives in the joint venture 
operations. 
  
Based on substantial scrutiny of Revenue Ruling 98-15 after its release, several 
conclusions can be drawn.  First, charitable organizations may participate in a joint venture with 
private investors and not automatically jeopardize their tax-exempt status.  Second, in such 
situations, the joint venture agreement should clearly provide that the charitable partner’s 
charitable purposes supersede any financial or private concerns in the event of a conflict between 
those goals.  In addition, all contracts and agreements between the joint venture and another for-
profit entity, such as a management agreement, must be entered into at arm’s length and reflect 
commercially reasonable terms.  Finally, Revenue Ruling 98-15 clearly favors the control of the 
joint venture’s governing body by the charitable organization and elevates this component to 
unprecedented importance.143  
 
2. Redlands Surgical Services v. Commissioner.  In Redlands, the Tax Court upheld the 
IRS’s denial of tax exempt status to a charitable organization which formed a joint venture with 
for-profit organizations.144  In arriving at its decision that private, rather than charitable, interests 
were being served, the court examined various factors similar to the factors the IRS enunciated in 
Revenue Ruling 98-15.145  The court noted, most significantly, that there was a lack of any 
express or implied obligation of the for-profit parties to place charitable objectives ahead of for-
profit objectives.146  Moreover, the relevant organizational documents did not include an 
overriding charitable purpose.147  The Tax Court held that the requirement that a charitable 
organization operate exclusively for charitable purposes is not satisfied merely by establishing 
“whatever charitable benefits [the partnership] may produce,” finding that the charitable partner 
lacked “formal or informal control sufficient to ensure furtherance of charitable purposes.”148  
Affirming the Tax Court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that ceding “effective control” 
of partnership activities impermissibly serves private interests.149  Redlands provides that a 
charitable organization may form partnerships, or enter into contracts, with private parties to 
further its charitable purposes on mutually beneficial terms, “so long as the charitable 
organization does not thereby impermissibly serve private interests.”150 
 
3. St. David’s Health Care System v. United States.  The issue of whether a charitable 
organization’s participation in a joint venture with for-profit participants would cause loss of the 
charitable organization’s tax exempt status was revisited in St. David’s, a case tried right here in 
Austin.  Relying on Revenue Ruling 98-15 and Redlands, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
focused on the issue of the charitable organization’s control over the joint venture, ultimately 
concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to whether the charitable 
143  See generally Mirkay, supra note 127. 
144  Redlands Surgical Services v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 47 (1999), aff’d, 242 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001).  
145  Id. 
146  Id. 
147  Id. 
148  Id. 
149  242 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001). 
150  Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-1 C.B. 974 (quoting Redlands Surgical Services v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 47 (1999)) 
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organization “ceded control” of its tax-exempt hospital.151  The court held that the determination 
of whether a charitable organization that enters into a partnership with for-profit partners 
operates exclusively for exempt purposes is not limited to “whether the partnership provides 
some (or even an extensive amount of) charitable services.”152  The charitable partner also must 
have the “capacity to ensure that the partnership’s operations further charitable purposes.”153  
Thus, “the [charity] should lose its tax-exempt status if it cedes control to the for-profit 
entity.”154  The Fifth Circuit ultimately wanted to see majority control by the charitable 
organization.  The IRS continues to view its position on control of the joint venture by the 
charitable organization, as supported by the St. David’s decision, as the “proper framework” for 
analyzing joint ventures between charitable organizations and for-profit entities.155 
 
4. Revenue Ruling 2004-51.  Revenue Ruling 2004-51 is the first instance in which the IRS 
acknowledges and supports equal ownership by charitable and for-profit participants in a joint 
venture, provided some protections are in place to ensure the furtherance of the charitable 
organization’s exempt purposes.156  The ruling pointedly looks at which partner controls the 
exempt activities.  If the charitable partner controls the exempt activities, the joint venture 
presumably will not endanger the tax exemption of the charitable organization.  Specifically, 
Revenue Ruling 2004-51 involved an exempt university that formed a limited liability company 
with a for-profit entity to provide distance learning via interactive video.  Ownership of the joint 
venture was split equally between the university and the for-profit partner, but the university 
controlled the academic portion of the joint venture’s activities, while the for-profit partner 
provided and controlled production expertise.  The ruling concluded that the university’s exempt 
status was not affected by the joint venture because the activities constituted an insubstantial part 
of the university’s activities.157  The ruling also implies that fifty-fifty control of the joint venture 
is acceptable as long as the charitable partner controls the charitable aspects of the joint 
venture.158 
  
Even though Revenue Ruling 2004-51 marks an indisputable movement forward in the 
IRS’s stance regarding the proper federal income tax treatment of joint ventures between 
charitable organizations and for-profit organizations, the ruling stops short of answering all of 
the questions and issues raised by venturers.  In particular, Revenue Ruling 2004-51 does not 
modify Revenue Ruling 98-15.  Therefore, the control requirement set forth in Revenue Ruling 
98-15 is still viewed as essential by the IRS, continuing to raise questions as to how and when it 
may be applied. 
 
151 St. David’s Health Care System v. United States, 349 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2003). 
152  Id. at 243. 
153  Id. 
154  Id. at 239. 
155  Id. 
156  Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-1 C.B. 974. 
157  Id. 
158 Id.  Revenue Ruling 2004-51 further stated that the limited liability company’s activities would not generate 
unrelated business income for the university because (1) the university had exclusive control over the educational 
content, (2) all contracts entered into by the limited liability company were at arms length and for fair market value, 
(3) allocations and distributions were proportional to each member’s ownership interest, (4) the video courses 
covered the same content as the university’s traditional classes, and (5) the video courses increased access to the 
university’s educational programs.  Id. 
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D. UBIT Treatment for a Charity Investing in a Joint Venture.  When a charity invests in a 
joint venture, the potential UBIT treatment of the investment to the charity will depend on the 
form of the investment.  For example, if the investment is structured as a loan from the charity to 
the joint venture, then the interest that the charity receives on the loan generally will be excluded 
from the charity’s unrelated business income as passive interest income.159  Similarly, if the joint 
venture is formed as a corporation,160 and the charity’s investment in the joint venture is 
structured as the acquisition of shares of stock in the corporation, then the dividend distributions 
the charity receives from the corporation generally will be excluded from the charity’s unrelated 
business income as passive dividend income.161  These interest and dividend exclusions may not 
apply, however, to the extent the interest or dividend income is treated as unrelated debt-financed 
income.162 
  
However, joint ventures are generally are treated as a partnership for federal income tax 
purposes.  Accordingly, the joint venture does not pay income tax on its net earnings.  Rather, 
the profits and losses of the joint venture are allocated to its members, each of whom report and 
pay tax on the allocated profits and losses in accordance with such member’s own tax status.163  
For example, if a charity invests in a joint venture that is formed as a partnership, the charity 
would be required to report its allocated items of profit and loss from the joint venture on the 
charity’s Form 990.   
  
To the extent the reported items of income do not qualify for the passive exclusions from 
the unrelated business income tax (e.g., royalties, rents, and capital gains),164 then the charity 
typically must apply the general three-prong UBIT test to determine whether the income from 
the business operated by the joint venture is unrelated business income for the charity.165  
Usually, investment in the joint venture will easily meet the first two prongs:  the activity 
conducted by the joint venture typically is a trade or business and normally the activity is 
regularly carried on.  Thus, the key determinant is whether the activity conducted by the joint 
venture substantially furthers the charitable purposes for which the charitable investor was 
granted tax-exemption.  This is a case by case determination.  Accordingly, a charity desiring to 
invest in a joint venture that is treated as a partnership for tax purposes must be careful to 
structure the joint venture to conduct activities which are closely aligned with the charity’s own 
mission. 
 
VIII. Compensation to Employees.  If a nonprofit assigns its rights to IP produced by an 
employee to the employee, then careful consideration should be taken to ensure that the 
assignment of the IP rights does not produce unreasonable compensation to the employee.  
159 See I.R.C. § 512(b)(1); but see I.R.C. § 512(b)(13)(A)for an exception for certain interest payments received 
from a controlled subsidiary. 
160 The result is different if the corporation is treated as an S corporation for federal income tax purposes.  All 
income distributable to a charitable S corporation shareholder is treated as unrelated business taxable income from 
an asset deemed in its entirety to be an interest in unrelated trade or business.  I.R.C. § 512(e). 
161 See I.R.C. § 512(b)(1). 
162 See generally I.R.C. § 514. 
163 See id. at 624. 
164 See I.R.C. § 512(b).  If the joint venture derives the passive income from debt-financed property, then such 
income may be included in the charitable investor’s unrelated business income as debt-financed income. 
165 See I.R.C. § 513. 
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Similarly, if the nonprofit and the employee share the rights to the IP, the employee’s share of 
revenues produced from licensing the IP needs to be taken into account in determining whether 
the employee receives unreasonable compensation.  Additionally, if the employee is a 
“disqualified person” with respect the nonprofit, the nonprofit will need to consider and approve 
the employee’s total compensation package, including the value of the rights retained by the 
employee, in accordance with the rebuttable presumption procedures described below. 
  
A. Excess Benefit Transactions Generally.  Section 4958 of the Code imposes an excise tax 
on disqualified persons who engage in excess benefit transactions with public charities.  An 
“excess benefit transaction” is any transaction in which an economic benefit is provided by the 
public charity directly or indirectly to or for the use of any disqualified person, if the value of the 
economic benefit provided exceeds the value of the consideration (including the performance of 
services) received in exchange for such benefit.166  The term “transaction” is used very generally 
and includes a disqualified person’s use of a charitable organization’s property and services 
provided to a disqualified person without adequate payment.  Prototypical examples of excess 
benefit transactions include paying excessive compensation to a director or officer or overpaying 
a director or officer for property the director or officer sells to the charitable organization.  
However, any direct or indirect benefit to a disqualified person may result in a violation of 
Section 4958 if the disqualified person does not provide adequate consideration for the benefit. 
  
When it applies, Section 4958 imposes an initial tax equal to 25% of the excess benefit 
on any disqualified person. 167 A tax of 10% of the excess benefit is imposed on any organization 
manager, i.e., any officer, director, or trustee of the organization, who knowingly participates in 
the transaction.168  The initial excise tax on organization managers is capped at $20,000.169  If a 
disqualified person engages in an excess benefit transaction with a public charity, corrective 
action must be taken to essentially undo the excess benefit to the extent possible and to take any 
additional measures to put the public charity in a financial position not worse than that in which 
it would be if the disqualified person were dealing under the highest fiduciary standards.170 
 
The term “disqualified person” includes any person who was, at any time during the 5-
year period ending on the date of the transaction, in a position to exercise substantial influence 
over the affairs of the organization.171  Some persons, including (but not limited to) board 
members, the president or chief executive officer, the treasurer or chief financial officer, family 
members of such individuals, and entities in which such individuals own 35% of the interests, 
are automatically considered “disqualified.”172   
 
Where a person is not automatically disqualified, all of the facts and circumstances will 
generally be considered to determine if the person has substantial influence over the affairs of the 
166  I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1). 
167  I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1). 
168  I.R.C. § 4958(a)(2).  
169  I.R.C. § 4958 (d)(2). 
170  I.R.C. § 4958(f)(6).  The Treasury Regulations contain specific procedures to correct certain excess benefit 
transactions between a public charity and a disqualified person.  See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-7. 
171  I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1). 
172 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(c).  
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organization.173  Factors tending to show that an individual exercises substantial influence 
include:  
 
i. the individual is a founder of the organization; 
ii. the individual is a substantial contributor to the organization; 
iii. the individual’s compensation is primarily based on revenues derived from activities 
of the organization, or of a particular department or function of the organization, that 
the individual controls; 
iv. the individual has or shares authority to control or determine a substantial portion of 
the organization’s capital expenditures, operating budget, or compensation for 
employees; 
v. the individual manages a discrete segment or activity of the organization that 
represents a substantial portion of the activities, assets, income, or expenses of the 
organization, as compared to the organization as a whole; or 
vi. the individual owns a controlling interest (measured by either vote or value) in a 
corporation, partnership, or trust that is a disqualified person.174 
 
Factors tending to show that an individual does not exercise substantial influence include:  
 
i. the individual has taken a bona fide vow of poverty as an employee, agent, or on 
behalf, of a religious organization; 
ii. the individual is a contractor (such as an attorney, accountant, or investment manager 
or advisor) whose sole relationship to the organization is providing professional 
advice (without having decision-making authority) with respect to transactions from 
which the individual will not economically benefit either directly or indirectly (aside 
from customary fees received for the professional advice rendered); 
iii. the direct supervisor of the individual is not a disqualified person; 
iv. the individual does not participate in any management decisions affecting the 
organization as a whole or a discrete segment or activity of the organization that 
represents a substantial portion of the activities, assets, income, or expenses of the 
organization, as compared to the organization as a whole; or 
v. any preferential treatment the individual receives based on the size of that 
individual’s contribution is also offered to all other donors making a comparable 
contribution as part of a solicitation intended to attract a substantial number of 
contributions.175 
 
1. Exception for Non-Highly Compensated Employees.  Nonetheless, an employee who 
does not receive economic benefits from the organization in excess of the indexed amount for 
being considered a highly compensated employee ($120,000 in 2015),176 is not a disqualified 
person even if the above factors indicate that the individual may have substantial influence over 
173  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(e). 
174  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(e)(2). 
175  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(e)(3). 
176  Notice 2014-70, 2014-48 I.R.B. 905 (Nov. 21, 2014).  Note that this is a different standard than the one used to 
determine which individuals are “highly-compensated employees” for Form 990 reporting purposes. 
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the affairs of the organization.177  This exception does not apply to employees who are 
automatically considered disqualified or who are substantial contributors to the organization.178 
 
2. Initial Contract Exception.  The theory behind the initial contract exception is that an 
individual who negotiates an employment agreement in good faith before the individual is in a 
position to exercise substantial influence over the organization should not be subject to sanctions 
even if the compensation under the employment agreement turns out to be excessive.  
Accordingly, Section 4958 does not apply to any fixed payment made to an individual with 
respect to an initial contract, regardless of whether the payment would otherwise constitute an 
excess benefit.179  An “initial contract” is a binding written agreement between the charitable 
organization and an individual who was not a disqualified person immediately before entering 
into the agreement.180 A “fixed payment” an amount of cash or other property specified in the 
agreement, or determined by a specified objective fixed formula, which is to be paid or 
transferred in exchange for the provision of specified services or property.181 A fixed formula 
may incorporate an amount that depends on future specified events or contingencies (such as the 
amount of revenues generated by one or more activities of the organization), provided that no 
person exercises discretion when calculating the amount of a payment or deciding whether to 
make a payment.182  If an initial contract provides for both fixed and non-fixed payments, the 
fixed payments will not be subject to Section 4958 while the non-fixed payments will be 
evaluated under an excess benefit transaction analysis, taking into account the individual’s entire 
compensation package.183   
  
B. What Constitutes Compensation?  A disqualified person’s entire compensation package 
must be evaluated to determine whether on the whole, the compensation received by the 
individual is reasonable for the services provided.  Accordingly, if the organization is relying on 
the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness, the organization’s board of directors must consider 
and approve the disqualified person’s entire compensation package, not merely salary and 
bonuses.  The compensation package includes all forms of cash and noncash compensation, all 
forms of deferred compensation if earned and vested, most fringe benefits whether or not 
taxable, employer-paid premiums for liability insurance coverage,184 expense allowances and 
reimbursements, and other economic benefits received by the disqualified person from the 
organization in exchange for the performance of services.185  However, the following benefits 
may be disregarded in evaluating the compensation package under Section 4958: (i)  employee 
fringe benefits that are excluded from gross income under Section 132; (ii)  expense 
reimbursements paid pursuant to an accountable plan; (iii) economic benefits provided to a 
177  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(d)(3). 
178  Id. 
179  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(3)(i). 
180  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(3)(iii). 
181  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(3)(ii). 
182  Id. 
183  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(3)(vi). 
184  A charitable organization’s payment of premiums for liability insurance covering Section 4958 excise taxes or 
indemnification of such taxes will not be an excess benefit if the premium or indemnification is included in the 
disqualified person’s compensation when paid and the disqualified person’s total compensation is reasonable.  
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(B)(2). 
185  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(B). 
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disqualified person solely as a member of or volunteer for the organization if the same benefit is 
available to the general public in exchange for a membership fee of no more than $75 per year; 
and (iv) economic benefits provided to a disqualified person solely as a member of a charitable 
class that the organization is organized to serve.186   
 
1. Determination of Reasonable Compensation.  In general, the value of services is the 
amount that would ordinarily be paid for like services by like enterprises (whether taxable or tax-
exempt) under like circumstances (i.e., reasonable compensation).  Section 162 standards apply 
in determining reasonableness of compensation, taking into account the aggregate benefits (other 
than any benefits specifically disregarded under Treasury Regulation Section 53.4958-4(a)(4)) 
provided to a person and the rate at which any deferred compensation accrues.187 The factors 
generally considered for purposes of Section 162 include (i) the employee’s qualifications, (ii) 
the nature, extent and scope of the employee’s work, (iii) the size and complexities of the 
employer’s business, (iv) the prevailing economic conditions, (v) the prevailing rates of 
compensation for comparable positions in comparable employers, and (vi) the employer’s salary 
policy that applies to all employees.188  The fact that bonus or revenue-sharing arrangement is 
subject to a cap is a relevant factor in determining the reasonableness of compensation. The fact 
that a state or local legislative or agency body or court has authorized or approved a particular 
compensation package paid to a disqualified person is not determinative of the reasonableness of 
compensation for purposes of Section 4958.189 
 
Normally, the facts and circumstances to be taken into consideration in determining 
reasonableness of a fixed payment are those existing on the date the parties enter into the 
agreement pursuant to which the payment is made.190  However, in the event of substantial non-
performance, reasonableness is determined based on all facts and circumstances, up to and 
including circumstances as of the date of payment. In the case of any payment that is not a fixed 
payment under an agreement, reasonableness is determined based on all facts and circumstances, 
up to and including circumstances as of the date of payment.191 
 
2. Substantiation of Economic Benefit Treated as Compensation.  To monitor disguised 
compensation, the Treasury Regulations require a charitable organization to clearly indicate its 
intent to treat an economic benefit as compensation when it is paid.  This rule is intended to 
prevent a charitable organization from later claiming that an excess benefit transaction, such as a 
below-market loan or personal expense allowance, was actually compensation and that the 
overall compensation package of the disqualified person was reasonable.192 To establish its 
intent, the organization must provide contemporaneous written substantiation of the economic 
186  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(4). 
187  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii). 
188  Mayson Manufacturing Co. v. Comm’r, 178 F.2d 115 (6th  Cir. 1949). 
189  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii). 
190 These general timing rules also apply to property subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. Therefore, if the 
property subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture satisfies the definition of fixed payment, reasonableness is 
determined at the time the parties enter into the agreement providing for the transfer of the property.  Treas. Reg. § 
53.4958-4(b)(2)(i). 
191  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(2)(i). 
192  See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(c)(4) Example 2. 
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benefit intended to be compensation for services.193  Contemporaneous written substantiation can 
be accomplished through the inclusion of the economic benefit on the individual’s Form W-2 or 
Form 1099, through a written employment agreement, or through the written contemporaneous 
documentation of the approved compensation package under the rebuttable presumption of 
reasonableness.194  However, the organization is not required to provide written substantiation of 
its intent to include nontaxable economic benefits, such as employer-provided medical insurance 
or employer contributions to a qualified retirement plan, as part of the individual’s 
compensation.195  As a result, even though contributions to qualified retirement plans and other 
nontaxable benefits are required to be taken into account in evaluating whether the overall 
compensation package is reasonable, they are not subject to the contemporaneous written 
substantiation requirement.  
 
3. Revenue-sharing Compensation Arrangements.  Revenue-sharing arrangements between 
a charitable organization and a disqualified person may be treated as an excess benefit 
transaction if the transaction results in prohibited private inurement.196  The scope of this rule is 
uncertain and is not addressed in the final regulations.  However, the implications of this rule 
may be significant for performance-based compensation arrangements and more complex 
arrangements to share revenue from intellectual property or other income-producing activities.   
 
After the enactment of Section 4958, proposed regulations were issued that addressed the 
application of the excess benefit transaction rules to revenue-sharing compensation 
arrangements.  These rules were not incorporated into the final regulations, and the Internal 
Revenue Service may later issue guidance in this area.  In the meantime, revenue-sharing 
compensation arrangements are evaluated under the general rules governing reasonableness of 
compensation paid to a disqualified person, leaving a fog of uncertainty about whether these 
arrangements are in fact reasonable. 
 
Since the old proposed regulations provide the only guidance on this issue, they are 
discussed herein for informational purposes, although they have no precedential value.  In 
general, whether a revenue-sharing arrangement constitutes an excess benefit transaction 
depends on all relevant facts and circumstances.  The arrangement may result in excess benefit if 
it permits a disqualified person to receive additional compensation without providing 
proportional benefits for the charitable organization.  Relevant factors include the relationship 
between the size of the benefit provided and the quality and quantity of the services provided, 
and the ability of the disqualified person to control the activities generating the revenues.197  The 
proposed regulations provided three examples illustrating the principles for determining whether 
a revenue-sharing transaction resulted in an excess benefit:198 
 
i. In the first example, the disqualified person was an in-house investment manager 
for the charitable organization.  In addition to the individual’s regular salary and benefits, the 
193  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(c)(1). 
194  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(c)(3). 
195  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(c)(2). 
196  I.R.C.  § 4958(c)(4). 
197  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-5(a) (withdrawn). 
198  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-5(d) (withdrawn). 
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individual was entitled to a bonus equal to a percentage of any increase in the net value of the 
portfolio.  The bonus was considered an incentive to maximize benefits and minimize 
expenses to the organization.  Thus, even though the individual had a measure of control over 
the portfolio performance, the bonus produced a proportional benefit for the organization.  
Therefore, the revenue-sharing arrangement was not considered an excess benefit transaction. 
 
ii. In the second example, the disqualified person was a third-party management 
company managing the charitable organization’s charitable gaming activities.  The 
management company controlled all of the activities generating revenues and paid the 
charitable organization a percentage of the net profits from these activities.  Since the 
management company provided all the personnel and equipment for the activities, the 
management company controlled all the costs charged to revenues and net revenues.  This 
structure did not provide the management company with an appropriate incentive to 
maximize benefits and minimize costs to the charitable organizations because the 
management company benefitted whether the net revenues were low because expenses were 
high or net revenues were high because expenses were low.  In contrast, the charitable 
organization only benefitted if the net revenues were high.  As a result, the entire transaction 
was considered an excess benefit transaction. 
 
iii. In the third example, the disqualified person was a university professor who was 
the principal investigator in charge of certain scientific research.  In addition to the 
professor’s regular salary and benefits, the professor was entitled to a specified percentage of 
any patent royalties on inventions produced by the professor’s research.  This arrangement 
provided an incentive for the professor to produce especially high quality work and no 
incentive to act contrary to the university’s interest.  Moreover, the university shared 
proportionately with the professor.  Lastly, the university owned and controlled the patent 
and the professor had no control over the revenues generated from the patent.  This 
arrangement was not considered an excess benefit transaction.  Many research institutions 
have invention and research policies similar to this example. 
 
C. Rebuttable Presumption of Reasonableness.  The Treasury regulations provide for a 
procedure, which if followed, creates a rebuttable presumption that a transaction between a 
public charity and a disqualified person will not constitute an excess benefit transaction within 
the meaning of Section 4958 of the Code.  These procedures apply to fixed payments and, with 
minor additional requirements, to non-fixed payments subject to a cap.199  Legislative history 
indicates that compensation arrangement or other financial transactions will be presumed to be 
reasonable if the transaction arrangement was approved in advance by an independent board (or 
an independent committee of the board) that (1) was composed entirely of individuals unrelated 
to and not subject to the control of the disqualified person, (2) obtained and relied upon 
appropriate data as to comparability, and (3) adequately documented the basis for its 
determination.200  The Treasury Regulations read into the legislative history three distinct 
requirements: (1) approval by an authorized body, (2) the appropriate data as to comparability, 
and (3) the documentation.201 
199  Non-fixed payments to a disqualified person not subject to a cap are generally not advisable. 
200  H.R. Rep. No. 104-506, at 56-57. 
201  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a)(1)-(3). 
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1. Approval by an Authorized Body.  The authorized body may be the Board of Directors or 
a committee duly authorized under state law to act on behalf of the Board of Directors.202  A 
person is not considered part of the authorized body if he merely meets to provide information to 
the board and then recuses himself.203  No person voting on the matter may have a conflict of 
interest with respect to the transaction.204  A member of the authorized body does not have a 
conflict of interest if the member: 
 
i. is not the disqualified person or related to any disqualified person who benefits from 
the transaction; 
ii. is not employed by or controlled by any disqualified person benefiting from the 
transaction; 
iii. is not receiving compensation or other payments from a disqualified person benefiting 
from the transaction; 
iv. has no material financial interest affected by the compensation arrangement or 
transaction; and 
v. does not approve a transaction providing economic benefits to any disqualified person 
participating in the compensation arrangement or transaction, who in turn has approved 
or will approve a transaction providing economic benefits to the member.205 
 
2. Appropriate Data as to Comparability.  The authorized body must have sufficient 
information to determine whether a compensation arrangement or other transaction will result in 
the payment of reasonable compensation or a transaction for fair value.  Relevant information 
includes, but is not limited to: 
 
i. compensation levels paid by other similarly-situated organizations (taxable or tax-
exempt); 
ii. availability of similar services in the applicable geographic area; 
iii. independent compensation surveys; 
iv.  written offers from similar institutions competing for the services of the person; 
v. independent appraisals of all property to be transferred; or 
vi. offers for property received as part of an open and competitive bidding process.206 
 
3. Documentation.  For the decision to be adequately documented, the records of the 
authorized body must note: 
 
i. the terms of the transaction and the date it was approved; 
ii. the members of the authorized body who were present during the debate on the 
transaction or arrangement and those who voted on it; 
iii. the comparability data obtained and relied upon and how the data was obtained; 
202  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(i)(A)-(C). 
203  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(ii). 
204  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a)(1). 
205  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(iii)(A)-(E). 
206  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(i). 
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iv. the actions taken with respect to consideration of the transaction by anyone who is
otherwise a member of the authorized body but who had a conflict of interest with
respect to the transaction; and
v. the basis for any deviation from the range of comparable data obtained.207
Moreover, such records must be prepared by the next meeting of the authorized body (or within 
60 days after the final action of the authorized body, if later than the next meeting) and must be 
reviewed and approved as reasonable, accurate and complete within a reasonable time period 
thereafter.208   
207  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(3)(i)(A)-(D), (ii). 
208  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(3)(ii). 
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